← Back Published on

Analysis: What does the captivation of several wanted members of the former Syrian regime mean for transitional justice?

In the past weeks, Syrian news reported on the captivation of several well known figures belonging to the old regime, namely Amjad Youssef, one of the main responsibles of Tadamon massacre in 2013, and the trial of Atef Najib, former head of the Political Security Branch in Daraa province.

But why are all these captivations and trials happening just now, almost two years after the fall of the old regime? What's behind them? And most importantly: what is their significance in the process of transitional justice and how can the latter be achieved?

Undoubtedly, these arrests and trials are a very important part of transitional justice. Yet, they are only a small part of it.

The recent cases all display the necessity to pacify the tensions connected with the unpleasant reality for the victims of the old regime, that the majority of persecutors are still either running around freely in Syria or are in exile, as is former president Bashar al-Assad himself.

The arrests are happening in a time when the feeling of ecstasy after the liberation among the population has worn off and the harsh reality of a country where 90% still live below the poverty line has surged again. Rising prices of electricity and everyday goods as well as the Syrian Pound having plunged back to pre-liberation prices despite the instauration of the new currency and despite the sanctions having been lifted, take a toll on the population that just lived through 14 years of civil war. Even though the minister of Finance recently announced a 50% rise in public salary, it is still way below what is needed to survive.

Now, are the arrests and trials happening solely as a way to distract from the economic situation? Certainly not. As already stated, the arrests and trials are of a big symbolic nature. Amjad Youssef, who infamously gained public attention through widespread videos connected to the Tadamon Massacres in 2013, and Atef Najib, cousin of the former president and responsabile for the abduction and torture of 15 boys who had written anti-Assad slogans in a public area in the beginning of the revolution in 2011, both are very symbolic figures of the old regime. Their capture and trial are crucial for the population to get a sense of justice after the atrocities they committed.

Yet, transitional justice needs more than just the capitation of several faces of the former government:

The Syrian case is an especially complicated one due to the “fragmentation of sovereignty" during Assad time and “the sharp societal divisions resulting from a conflict that lasted fourteen years” , as the Syrian Network for Human rights puts it. Therefore, potential solutions will be multidimensional and a collective narrative is needed to prevent sectarian stigmatisation of single groups. Though the whole process itself and their singular aspects are too complex to be displayed in this analysis, we will mention some basic principles that are urgently needed in order to stabilize the country:

First of all, as already mentioned, economic growth and security are fundamental when it comes to transitional security. Without job prospects and a liveable future, especially young people risk falling into the hands of extremist groups or leaving the country, creating the vicious cycle we saw during the civil war. On the one hand, one of the most fundamental aspects of transitional security is a stable political environment with a unified country and stable institutions. The instauration of a representative body is still unclear: only very recently Kobane, Hasaka, Qamishli, and Derik (al-Malikiyah) effected their vote for the people’s assembly leaving Suweida as the last governante to designate their representatives. And even in these elections, parts of the Kurdish population accused the elections of being unfair and undemocratic. On the other hand, different aspects of basic infrastructure like health service are especially important, as recent EU investments showed.

Lastly, criminal laws need to be adapted and reviewed in order to prevent the risk of impunity or selective justice. This, again, can only happen with a legislative body of elected representatives. But to which extent can these laws prosecute the responsibles? As already mentioned, the “fragmentation of sovereignty" poses a complicated situation for transitional justice. Additionally, time is scarce: Not acting on time might cause the population to take justice into their own hands.

Then, there is also another aspect that needs to be considered: Can there be peace and prosperity if not everyone is judged according to the law or will it lead to further sectarian disputes and stigmatisation? Or will judging “everyone” simply be not possible due to the immense scale of responsibles?

Additionally, we need to ask ourselves if everyone is even likely to be prosecuted. Especially business men with influence and financial power that might have been involved with the old regime have not yet been called out publicly or brought to trial. As the Syrian Observer reported, “when victims and their families see suspected perpetrators moving freely, protected by social networks, wealth, or political ambiguity, restraint begins to appear less like wisdom and more like abandonment”

In the end, transitional security rests in the hands of the Syrian people themselves. Though important and highly symbolic, the capitation and trial of Amjad Youssef and Atef Najib rest a minor step in reaching transitional justice. If other basics like economic and political stability are not reached, the new government will not gain the public’s trust with solely symbolic arrests and trials. They need to keep in mind that stability without law can turn into revenge.